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COMBAT RESTRAINTS
Howard S. Levie
Combat restraints fall into two separate and distinct categories: (1) Restraints on the use of particular weapons, such as the prohibitions on the use
of dumdum bullets and poison gas; and
(2) restraints on the actions that may be
taken during the course of combat, such
as the prohibitions on the denial of
quarter and on the shooting of civilian
noncombatants. The discussion which
follows will be concerned solely with
this latter type of restraints on permissible combat actions.
Most of these restraints, of both
categories, have their origin in custom
which has evolved over long periods of
time. Many of these customs have been
codified, primarily at The Hague in
1899 1 and 19072 and at Geneva in
19293 and 1949.4 However, they have
not all been codified and, accordingly,
there are still some rules for which we

must have recourse to custom. At the
first successful codification in 1899, in
order to leave no doubt in this respect,
it was agreed that the preamble of the
convention being drafted should include
a provision (which has become known
as the deMartens Clause, after its author) to the effect that apart from the
rules codified in the Regulations then
being adopted, "populations and
belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of ihternational law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and
the requirements of the public conscience. ,,5
There are, of course, a very large
number of restraints on the actions that
may be taken during the course of
combat. The four specific areas of combat restraints which will be discussed
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are: (1) Military necessity; (2) reprisals;
(3) protection of civilian noncombatants; and (4) protection of prisoners of

war.
Military Necessity. Inasmuch as this
doctrine is really an excuse for noncompliance with combat restraints, its
importance as an introduction to any
discussion of such restraints is obvious.
Over 100 years ago, in 1863, Francis
Lieber defined this term as follows:
"Military necessity, as understood by
modern civilized nations, consists in the
necessity of those measures which are
indispensable for securing the ends of
the war, and which are lawful according
to the modern law and usages of iwar.,,6
(Emphasis added.) Note that the last
clause requires that all actions taken
because of military necessity must be
lawful actions. Contrary to the foregoing, The German War Book, published
early in this century, adopted the doctrine of "Kriegsraeson," which is, in
effect, the doctrine that the end justifies
the means: "Humanitarian claims such
as the protection of men and their
goods can only be taken into consideration insofar as the nature of the war
permits.,,7 That this was the Nazi policy
during World War II is indicated by the
following statement found in the
opinion of the International Military
Tribunal:
There can be no doubt that the
majority of [the war crimes committed during World War II by the
Germans] arose from the Nazi
conception of "total war," with
which the aggressive wars were
waged. For in this conception of
"total war," the moral ideas
underlying the conventions which
seek to make war more humane
are no longer regarded as having
force or validity. Everything is
made subordinate to the overmastering dictates of war. 8
U.S. military doctrine has not
changed during the period of more than

a century since Lieber formulated it in
1863. The present U.S. Army Manual
states that military necessity "justifies
those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible.,,9 (Emphasis
added.) It goes on to call attention to
the fact that "military necessity has
been generally rejected as a defense for
acts forbidden by the customary and
conventional laws of war inasmuch as
the latter have been developed and
framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity." The British
Army Manual is substantially to the
same effect. 1 0
The subject of military necessity as a
defense for illegal combat actions was
considered in a number of war crimes
cases after World War II. Attention has
already been invited to the statement of
the International Military Tribunal. In
the case of United States v. Krupp, the
U.S. Military Tribunal said:
In short, these rules and customs. of warfare are designed
specifically for all phases of war.
They comprise the law for such
emergency. To claim that they
can be wantonly-and at the sole
discretion of anyone belligerentdisregarded when he. considers his
own situation to be critical means
nothing more or less than to
abrogate the laws and customs of
war entirely. 11
Similarly, in United States v. List, another U.S. Military Tribunal held:
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of
war, to apply any amount and
kind of force to compel the com;
plete submission of the enemy
with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money....
The rules of international law
must be followed even if it results
in the loss of a battle or even a
war. ,,12 (Emphasis added.)
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As a practical matter, there are still
many who would agree with the implications of Bismarck's query: "What
head of government would allow his
state and its citizenry to be conquered
by another state just because of internationallaw?,,13 While this may appear to
put the problem at the civilian political
level and to remove responsibility from
the military commander, that is not
always true. In any event, it must be
borne in mind that when a chief of state
decides that military necessity requires
the violation of affirmative rules of the
law of armed conflict he will not thereafter be held accountable alone: Those
who pass down or execute his illegal
orders in this respect may likewise be
adjudged war criminals. 14 It might also
be noted that, prior to the advent of the
nuclear age (and, perhaps, even since
that event), it was rare, indeed, that the
illegal application of the rule of military
necessity would make the difference
between victory and defeat.
Now let us attempt to apply the
restrictions on the doctrine of military
necessity to specific factual situations.
The law of armed conflict specifically protects prisoners of war from
maltreatment. For example, an armored
unit has just captured a large number of
prisoners of war. It receives urgent
orders to move forward to participate in
~ attack which is taking place some
miles away. What does it do with its
prisoners of war? It cannot take them
along. It has no personnel available to
guard them and no facilities for sending
them to the rear. Does military necessity permit the shooting of these POWs?
No. The rule protecting them from
maltreatment, including death, was
drafted and adopted with full knowledge of the existence of the doctrine of
military necessity and overrides it insofar as the treatment of prisoners of
war is concerned. To shoot them would
violate an affirmative rule of the law of
armed conflict and the participants in
such an episode would be guilty of

having committed a war crime. (A number of the individuals responsible for an
incident of this nature at Malme'dy, 15
including SS Colonel Joachim Peiper,
were convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death. 16 While they were not
executed, they spent 13 years in jailand in July 1976, Peiper while living in
the South of France was assassinated by
revenge seekers. 17 The massacre of
Poles in the Katyn Woods 18 may have
been of the same nature. So also was
Napoleon's massacre of more than
3,500 Arabs in Jaffa in 1799. 19 )
The law of armed conflict now specifically prohibits the taking of civilians
as hostages. In another example, resistance groups in the rear are destroying
railroad tracks, blowing up trains, and
ambushing truck routes, thus critically
interfering with essential supply of
troops in combat. The local commander
orders the random taking of civilian
hostages, some to be carried· in the
trains and trucks being attacked, and
others to be executed at the ratio of 10
civilian hostages for each soldier of his
command who is killed by the irregulars. Is this order legal? No.- The rule
prohibiting the taking of civilian
hostages was drafted and adopted with
full knowledge of the existence of the
doctrine of military necessity and overrides it insofar as the use of hostages is
concerned. To take hostages in the
manner and for the purposes indicated
would violate an affirmative rule of the
law of armed conflict and the participants in such an episode would be guilty
of having committed a war crime. 2 0
Reprisals. Reprisals are acts of retaliation, in the form of conduct which
would otherwise be illegal, committed
by one side in an armed conflict in
order to put pressure on the other side
to compel it to abandon a course of
illegal action which it has been following and to return to compliance with
the law of armed conflict.
It has sometimes been argued that
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reprisals lead, not to redress of the
wrong previously committed, but to
new breaches. Nations have, in theory,
admitted this to be a fact by agreeing to
prohibit reprisals against various categories of protected persons and even
against certain categories of property.
Nevertheless, reprisals do still remain a
possibility, however limited, under the
law of armed conflict. Sometimes they
are the only measure available to a
•belligerent in its attempt to secure
compliance with the law of armed conflict by its adversary.
There are at least seven matters to be
considered with respect to reprisals:
1. The enemy must have committed
an act which violates the law of armed
conflict. (It could be argued that the act
must also either be a continuing one or
that the enemy has indicated that it will
take the same action in the future when
the occasion arises.)
2. Reprisals must not be used until
appropriate efforts to secure compliance
with the particular law of armed conflict being violated by the enemy have
been attempted and have been unsuccessful.
3. Reprisals should be used only
upon the orders of a high military
commander. Since the use of reprisals
will rarely remain localized, the supreme
commander or even the civilian government, should normally be made aware
of and approve the use of reprisals
before they are actually undertaken.
4. Reprisals may only be directed
against enemy personnel who, and
property which, are not within any
provision excluding them as the targets
of reprisals. For example, enemy hospitals may not legally be the targets of
reprisals as they are specifically protected against attack. 21 Similarly, civilian noncombatants22 and prisoners of
war23 may not legally be the targets of
reprisals as they are protected from
reprisals by specific prohibitions contained in the relevant 1949 Geneva
Conventions. In effect, this really means

that reprisals may only be directed
against enemy combatants and against
enemy property not protected by a
specific rule of the law of armed conflict.
5. Reprisals must be roughly proportional to the enemy's original illegal act.
Of course, it will frequently not be
possible to give an exact quantitative
value to the enemy's illegal act-but it
will usually be possible to approximate
that value within reasonable bounds .
For example, when, during World War
II, the Nazis adopted a reprisal policy of
10 to 1, and even 100 to 1, there could
be no question but that they were
violating the rule of proportionality.24
Similarly, the action taken at Lidice was
a reprisal which outrageously violated
the rule of proportionality. 2 5 But when
the enemy intentionally bombs a hospital there can only be a commonsense
gauge of proportionality.
6. Reprisals need not necessarily be
of the same nature as the original illegal
act. For example, the reprisal response
to maltreatment of prisoners of war by
the enemy need not, in fact it may not,
be maltreatment of prisoners 9f war by
the other side.
7. While relatively little has been
written on the subject, it appears that
the very nature and purpose of reprisals
require that they be directed against the
state whose personnel committed the
alleged violation of the law of armed
conflict and not against an ally of that
state. 26
Here are some specific cases of reprisals which have occurred in the past.
During the American Civil War there
was no rule of the law of war protecting
prisoners of war against being the targets of reprisals. A Union commander
(Custer) executed six members of a
Confederate irregular cavalry unit on
the basis that they were bandits, not
soldiers. The Confederate commander
(Mosby) executed five Union prisoners
of war as a reprisal. That ended the
episode, the irregulars captured there-
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after were treated as prisoners of war. 2 7
Reprisals worked in this instance.
During World War II, in 1942 at
Dieppe and at Sark, Canadian and
British commandos tied the hands of
their German prisoners of war together
in order to prevent them from destroying documents having intelligence value.
The Germans captured a copy of the
order containing instructions in this
regard and promptly responded by
handcuffing 1,000 British and Canadian
inmates of prisoner-of-war camps for 12
hours a day. The British, apparently
contending that their action had not
been a violation of the law of armed
conflict but that the German action
was, responded by handcuffing a large
number of German prisoners of war.
Although the British abandoned the use
of shackles after a few months, the
Germans continued the practice for
another year.28 Both alleged reprisals
were, of course, violations of the prohibition on reprisals against prisoners of
war.
During 1965 a member of the Vietcong was tried and convicted of acts of
terrorism by a court of the Republic of
Vietnam and he was executed. Three
days later the Vietcong announced the
reprisal execution of an American
prisoner of war. Shortly thereafter three
members of the Vietcong were tried and
convicted for acts of terrorism by another court of the Republic .of Vietnam
and were executed. A few days later the
Vietcong announced the reprisal execution of two American prisoners of
war.29 Apart from the fact that these
alleged reprisals by the Vietcong violated the specific prohibition .against
making prisoners of war the targets of
reprisals (the Vietcong claimed not to
be bound by the humanitarian conventions), it should be noted that it was the
Republic of Vietnam, not the United
States, which had committed the acts
against which the reprisals were directed. The Vietcong were, in effect,
executing American prisoners of war in

order to apply pressure on the Republic
of Vietnam. In this case the indirect
pressure apparently accomplished its
purpose as Vietcong te.rrorists subsequently convicted and sentenced to
death were not executed.
Protection of Civilian Noncombatants. During the early years of recorded
history, such as that contained in the
Bible, no distinction was made between
combatants and noncombatants, and all
were usually put to the sword or enslaved. But by the late Middle Ages,
before the days of professional armies
and rampant nationalism, apart from
the sieges of cities, war could more or
less pass the civilian noncombatant by,
leaving him physically untouched.
Changes in this respect began to appear
in the 17th century and a rather radical
transformation had occurred by the
beginning of the 19th century, particularly during the Napoleonic wars. While
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations30 included some combat restraints
on actions directed against civilian noncombatants, such as a prohibition
against the bombardment of un. defended cities, a prohibition against
the use of coercion to obtain military
information, and the granting of a protected status to members of the levee en
masse, there were really few rules protecting civilian noncombatants from
being intentionally made the targets of
combat actions. Even the 1949 Geneva
Civilians Convention,31 revolutionary in
concept as it was, contains surprisingly
few provisions that can be considered as
protecting the civilian noncombatant
from combat actions. It is true that this
Convention prohibits belligerents from
using civilians to render an area immune
from attack; prohibits the use of civilians as the objects of reprisals; and
prohibits the use of civilians as hostages.
But when one has completed that short
list one has just about covered all of the
protection of civilians against combat
actions contained in the 159 articles
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of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention.
Efforts are currently being made to
remedy this situation. The Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which has already convened on
Develop~ent

three separate occasions and which is
expected to complete its work during
1977, has tentatively adopted a number
of articles for the protection of civilians
from combat activities, most of which
can be expected to be a part of the
Protocol finally approved. One such
article (Article 46, adopted in committee by consensus)32 provides that '.'civilians shall enjoy general protection
against dangers arising from military
operations." It then goes on to enumerate a number of specific protections:
• Prohibition against making civilians the objects of an attack.
• Prohibition against acts or threats
of violence intended to spread terror
among the civilian population.
• Prohibition against indiscriminate
attacks. These attacks are defined as
those which have no specific military
objective; or those which employ a
method or means of attack which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective, or the effect of which cannot
be limited to that objective. Examples
of indiscriminate attacks are area
bombardments where the area so bombarded contains a concentration of
civilians; and attacks which would cause
loss of civilian lives in a number which
would be excessive in the light of the
"concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. "
• Prohibition against attacks against
civilians by way of reprisals.
• Prohibition against the use of
civilians to render a location immune
from military operations, including the
movement of civilians to shield military
objectives or military operations.
A number of other articles of the
Protocol which have been tentatively

approved would also afford. protection
to civilians against combat activities.
Thus, Article 48 (adopted in committee
by consensus)33 forbids military attacks
on "objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population," such as
foodstuffs, food-producing areas, crops,
livestock, drinking water, etc. This prohibition is applicable whether the
motive for the attack is "to starve out
civilians, to cause them to move away,
or any other motive." Again, Article 50
(adopted in committee by a vote of
66-0-3)34 and Article 51 (adopted in
committee by consensus)35 require the
commander of an attacking. force to
take certain precautions intended to
protect the local civilian population
before the attack is actually launched.
These articles of the Protocol to the
1949 Geneva Conventions which is in
process of preparation are but a few
examples of what the Diplomatic Conference hopes to accomplish towards
the goal of better protecting civilian
noncombatants from the effects of combat actions. Unfortunately, when one
has. had .the opportunity to read and
analyze them, one cannot avoid the
feeling that a number of them are so
impractical that it will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for even the
most law-abiding commander to comply
with them fully. This is regrettable as it
means that there will be a limited
number of ratifications and many
valuable and acceptable provisions will
be lost; or there will be ratifications but
no compliance.
Prisoners of War. The 1949 Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention36 is
probably the most complete single code
contained in the law of armed conflict.
Since its drafting and acceptance by the
vast majority of the nations which
constitute the present-day world community, there has been available for the
guidance of nations at war a substantial
and pervasive body of law on this
subject.

207
We are here concerned, of course,
only with those aspects of this Convention which relate to the protection of
prisoners of war by restraints on combat. Understandably, there are only a
few provisions of the Prisoner of War
Convention which may be deemed. to
fall within this category. Thus, prisoners
of war are to be evacuated from the
combat zone as soon as possible after
capture and are not to be unnecessarily
exposed to danger while awaiting such
evacuation (Article 19); the evacuation
is to be accomplished in as humane·a
manner as possible (Article 20); the
capturing troops are prohibited from
taking anything from the prisoners of
war except arms, military equipment,
and military documents (Article 18);
prisoners of war may not be sent to, or
detained in, areas where they will be
exposed to the dangers of the combat
zone, nor may they be used to render an
area immune from attack (Article 23);
and prisoner-of-war camps are to be
marked so that they can be identified
by an attacking force (Article 23). Of
course, as has already been noted in the
discussion of military necessity, the
protection against maltreatment con-

tained in the Convention includes a
positive ban on shooting them even
though the combat force which captures
them does not have the facilities for
their evacuation.3 7 In fact, the willful
killing of prisoners of war is a grave
breach of the Convention and calls for
penal sanctions against the offenders. 3 8
They cannot avoid this responsibility by
refusing quarter and thus contending
that the individuals killed were never
prisoners of war, since Article 23( d) of
the 1907 Hague Regulations39 specifically bans any declaration that no
quarter will be given.
The foregoing is a rather summary
treatment of four very important areas
of the law of armed conflict dealing
with combat restraints. However, it
should demonstrate beyond dispute
that, paradoxical as it may seem,
civilization has evolved many humanitarian rules calling for such conflict to
be conducted in a manner calculated to
reduce unnecessary suffering and to
provide a maximum of protection for
the victims thereof, combatant and noncombatant. The problem in this area, as
in many other areas, is not lack of law,
it is lack of compliance with the law.
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